requirement for NGS to be overlooked. The future control of NGS was also a potential problem.
The defence cuts that were scheduled to take place following the 1981 defence review included a drastic reduction in amphibious forces, which would have -at least in the minds of politicians -made 148 (Meiktila) Commando Forward Observation Battery, Royal Artillery (RA), a dedicated spotting unit, redundant.
The future of NGS was bleak, despite an illustrious past. NGS had an extremely long lineage and had been used to support amphibious assaults since the development of the naval gun. Often overlooked campaigns such as the Ottomans' amphibious invasion of Malta in 1565 was achieved successfully in no small measure to direct naval bombardment. 6 As technology and gunnery techniques were continually improved, NGS grew in prominence. Naval gunfire did not always live up to expectations, such as the inauspicious employment of NGS at Gallipoli in 1915, but the successful utilisation of the capability during the Second World War confirmed its validity.
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The Second World War was arguably the zenith of NGS. Malcolm Muir, Jr. has emphasised: 'Gunfire from ships offshore was one of the great assets making possible Allied amphibious landings in both the European and Pacific theaters.' 8 Indeed, NGS proved to be vital across a range of theatres during the Second World War, although the manner in which the capability was used varied. Whilst sometimes overlooked, a number of lessons emerged from the Mediterranean, which led to a range of developments, including the introduction of maps specifically gridded for spotting, improvements in radio technology and the deployment of army artillery officers onboard ships. 9 Those improvements undoubtedly enhanced the provision of NGS in the European theatre, including at Normandy in 1944. 10 In the Pacific, NGS, in combination with air support, made a significant contribution to amphibious operations, especially as the war progressed. 11 Improvements implemented after the Battle of Tarawa in November 1943 further increased the effectiveness of NGS and the capability was used to good effect during subsequent Pacific operations. 12 Notably, the scale and duration of NGS differed during operations in Europe and the Pacific. As a general rule, short intensive bursts were used to paralyse and demoralise the enemy in Europe, whereas much more extensive bombardments were utilised in the Pacific to overwhelm and destroy enemy defences prior to amphibious operations. 13 Whilst the level of success achieved varied, NGS proved to be a valuable and versatile capability.
The lessons of the Second World War were applied during the Korean War, where NGS was used extensively. Due to the central mountain ranges, Communist forces were compelled to move troops and supplies along the coastlines and in range of naval guns. Although it should be noted that targets were more numerous and more important on the east coast. As the USN was principally responsible for maintaining the blockade on the east coast, they had more opportunity to engage in NGS than Commonwealth and allied ships, which generally operated Although the utilisation of NGS during the Suez Crisis is less well known, the limited use of the capability contributed to the success of the assault on Port Said on 6 November 1956.
In conjunction with air strikes, NGS was delivered against the beach at Port Said and a nearby collection of huts, even though the inclusion of the capability proved to be a contentious issue. 18 Initially, British rules of engagement prevented any guns over 4.5" calibre from participating in the bombardment. The situation was further complicated when an order was received from cabinet on the night before the assault, which precluded any preliminary naval 'bombardment'. 19 The decision was made largely for political reasons, but the inherent risks involved in assaulting a fortified position led to the RN replacing the 'bombardment' with NGS. 20 In effect, the RN had exploited a difference in terminology to circumvent the restriction on fire support, but it proved to be a sound military decision, as NGS contributed to the success of the assault.
NGS was also utilised during the Malayan Emergency, but the use of the capability was constrained by the nature of the operating environment. 21 Although there was an inevitable decrease in the degree of spotting accuracy at night, the reduction was not significant and much of it could be overcome through the use of illumination rounds. 29 Almost all of 148 Battery's training for NGS forward observation had been conducted during daylight so an initial adjustment was required. However, in the end, the transition to night time NGS proved to be a relatively smooth process, as outlined by Captain
Chris Brown, an NGFO:
It meant that…we had to get used to night vision...we regularly did reconnaissance by day...we confirmed enemy locations during the day so that we could then engage them in darkness. Interestingly enough, as far as I'm aware, it didn't have too much of an impact on the infantry or the supported arm because the infantry, by and large, were quite happy to conduct their operations at night. We sensed that we had an advantage over the enemy at night and therefore, it was, I think, a happy coincidence that the ships were safer on the gunline at night and therefore, naval gunfire was available at night and the infantry felt happier about night so it all came together.
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As all Brigade attacks were conducted at night, the withdrawal of NGS during the day did not have a detrimental impact on the land forces. Spotters worked around the challenges of operating in the darkness by creating a system for night shoots. NGFOs Captain Hugh
McManners and Bombardier Nick Allin devised a system whereby Allin would control the radio by establishing morse communications with the ship until they were close enough to switch to voice communications. McManners would then select a target that could be easily adjusted and which was distant from any settlements, measuring the bearings and distances with special-purpose binoculars. The enemy could be observed using night vision, allowing any corrections to be made. 31 A combination of night vision, spotting expertise and the desire of land forces to attack at night created the circumstances for the efficient use of NGS.
The destructive capability of NGS and its inherent capacity to restrict the enemy's freedom of movement made an important contribution to the success of Operation Corporate.
That said, it should be noted that there were limitations to the destructiveness of NGS, which were recorded by Brigadier Julian Thompson, the Commander of 3 Commando Brigade:
Neither light artillery nor NGS 4.5 inch guns are heavy enough to destroy static defensive positions. Although some fire may kill, wound or demoralize some of the enemy it can be relied upon only to keep the occupants' heads down while the rounds are actually falling; in gunner parlance, to neutralize them...
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However, despite the limitations against entrenched enemy positions, NGS was far from impotent. NGS was used to destroy or damage specific targets such as artillery, communications facilities, bunkers, foxholes and trenches. Such was the accuracy of NGS that specific targets could be accurately engaged, including a radar aerial that was 'toppled from its plinth' by HMS Glasgow. The devastation caused by NGS also proved to be essential in restricting the movement of Argentine forces. Commodore Clapp recalled that when ships were firing on the gunline, one of the most important outcomes was that it 'kept the enemy's heads down at crucial moments' and allowed the British to 'move their own guns, positions etc. without threat of retaliation'. 36 On a number of occasions, NGS proved to be effective at containing the enemy. 45 Initially, British forces had hoped to remain unobserved during their approach and at least until reconnaissance patrols were on the ground. In order to reconnoitre the island, an SAS party was landed on the island at Fortuna Glacier, which they themselves had selected. The insertion was conducted in spite of treacherous weather conditions on 21 April, but an extraction was required on the following morning. During the extraction, two out of the three helicopters crashed due to the conditions but, fortunately, no casualties were suffered. An additional landing using rigid inflatable boats (RIBs) was attempted on the night of 22/23 April but that also proved unsuccessful. D. Longdon descended into a vicious struggle, which lasted throughout the night and resulted in the bloodiest battle of the war. 3 Para's assault met with initial success and they were able to quickly overrun the first line of defence, but they became bogged down by the defensive action of the enemy. Fire support made an essential contribution to the success of the assault, particularly the 165 heavier shells fired by Avenger. 54 In tandem with the support provided by the 105mm guns, NGS helped to break the resistance of the enemy. 55 However, it should be noted that it was aggressive and brave action by the infantry that ultimately won the day.
The non-availability or loss of firepower could and did have a detrimental impact on the land battle, which was never more apparent than during the Battle for Darwin/Goose Green, which was initiated at 0200 on 28 May, and was later described by Brigadier Thompson as 'perhaps the most remarkable action fought by a British infantry battalion since the Second World War'. 56 As the 2 nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (2 Para), were without transport, their organic firepower was reduced to two 81mm mortars, which made them reliant on the artillery support provided by three guns from 8 Commando Battery, 29th Commando Regiment, RA, and NGS from HMS Arrow. 57 The largest bombardment conducted by RN ships up to that point in the campaign was scheduled for the night of the attack to divert the attention of the Argentinians away from Darwin and Goose Green. Including the eventual support provided to the attack itself, five ships delivered over 700 rounds that night at targets as diverse as Stanley airfield.
During the battle, HMS Arrow's Mark 8 gun system jammed, precluding the continuation of NGS for two hours, which prior to that point had proven to be very effective.
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The lack of NGS, even for that relatively short period was inopportune, as Major Philip Neame, D Company Commander, ended up attacking with limited fire support. 59 As there was only one barrel on this ship, there was no way to continue NGS, and although Captain Kevin Arnold, the NGFO who was controlling the bombardment, did provide fire support using aircraft, it could not make up the shortfall. 60 Whilst NGS alone was never going to be sufficient to dislodge Argentinian forces, it proved to be an effective form of fire support, which contributed to the success of the Brigade attacks.
There when you need it: The Limitations of Firepower During the Falklands War
The intended purpose of NGS varied throughout the conflict, but part of its importance derived from the mere availability of the capability. The availability and, more frequently, the nonavailability of other forms of firepower served as one of the main drivers for the prolific use of NGS. There can be no doubt that land-based artillery in the form of 105mm light guns, which were predominantly transported by helicopter, proved to be vital. The official lessons of the Falklands campaign lauded the accurate delivery of 17,500 rounds and concluded that the 'performance was excellent'. 64 However, the performance should not be allowed to mask the absence of medium and heavy land-based artillery, which would have further enhanced the capacity of British forces.
NGS was always going to be an invaluable asset but its importance was increased by 61 the fact that it 'fulfilled that role that would traditionally have been provided by medium artillery'. 65 The 4.5" naval shell was particularly effective in the Falklands because the high explosive round could be fitted with a proximity fuse, which meant that it could be set to go off on impact or proximity. The prevalence of peat bog in the Falklands made the proximity fuse extremely useful because instead of going off on impact, which would have simply thrown up tonnes of earth, the round could be set to go off at a height of about ten metres above the ground, leading to a devastating outcome.
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It was aptly deduced in The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons that: 'The infantry would not have been able to carry their objectives without the support they received from artillery and Naval bombardment', and it should be emphasised that the 8,000 4.5" rounds proved to be a suitable substitute for medium artillery. 67 Aside from the weight of firepower, the mobility of NGS provided another advantage over artillery, which needed to be lifted by helicopters that were in short supply, particularly following the loss of Atlantic Conveyor and her cargo of six Wessex, three Chinook and one Lynx helicopter on 25 May.
The Darwin/Goose Green attack by 2 Para demonstrated the potential limitations on artillery due to issues of mobility. Competing requirements meant that the lift capacity had to be divided between other needs and could not be solely committed to moving the artillery.
Commodore Clapp documented the dilemma that he faced in regard to transport commitments:
'I would supply helicopters to fly in guns and ammunition but would have to balance this requirement with the offload and first tentative move out towards our already chosen stepping stone of Port Salvador.' 68 The difficulty encountered in moving artillery rapidly was not sufficiently overcome due to the limited availability of lift assets.
Additionally, there were also constraints on the availability of CAS. The small number of Sea Harriers in theatre and their indispensability in a defensive role meant that their activities needed to be limited. The attack on the airstrip at Goose Green by three Sea Harriers on 25
May, which led to the loss of one aircraft and the death of the pilot, Lieutenant Nick Taylor, prompted Admiral Woodward to conserve the aircraft by limiting their offensive role:
I also decided I should not risk any more of our precious Harriers by allowing them to go out on these high-speed, low-level, cluster-bomb attacks against heavily defended Argentine positions. Quite simply, I could not afford to lose my strictly limited force of air defence aircraft -only about thirty-four in the whole country -on this not-very-effective sort of task. It made better sense to wait for the RAF [Royal Air Force] to provide some Harrier GR3s, not much use at air defence and optimized for ground attack. I resolved that from now on, if they were to bomb at all, it would only be against specific high-value targets or from high level -less accurate, I knew, but less expensive in Sea Harriers. weather dependent' and 'so sparse as to be a bonus and nothing more'. 70 Thompson's concerns were mirrored by Major General Moore and his staff, who went to great lengths to ensure that there would be sufficient ships for the provision of NGS, if CAS proved to be lacking during the Brigade attacks. 71 including AAW and ASW. When fire support could be provided, the timeliness was not always as good as the response of artillery due to the time taken to prepare the ship to fire. In addition,
there were occasional problems with the serviceability of the weapons platform. The vulnerability of the ships to air attack also prompted the decision to confine NGS to the cover of darkness. Indeed, it was appreciated that a number of reasons could lead to NGS becoming unavailable; not least the very real risk that a ship might be damaged or sunk. 72 Ultimately, however, the amphibious nature of Operation Corporate, combined with the absence of heavy artillery and the periodic unavailability of other forms of firepower, ensured that NGS was instrumental in the successful outcome of the war.
There was a feeling that the firepower of the Task Force could have been even further enhanced had the ships been fitted with heavier-calibre guns. Major Morgan declared that: 'In an ideal world, a five-inch is a better gun', as 'it's a bigger bang for your buck', whilst Brigadier In order to distribute their resources most effectively, 148 Battery was divided into NGFO teams consisting of five men each. Each NGFO team was led by a captain in order to create an 'officer-to-officer relationship' rather than a 'more hierarchical command structure' between the spotter and the senior officer of the supported arm. 84 The remaining four members of each team were: a bombardier, a leading radio operator (LRO) or radio operator class one (RO1) from the RN, a lance bombardier and a gunner. 85 The NGFO teams were deployed alongside ground forces and worked directly to the officer commanding the supported arm.
The spotting teams were first deployed to support the re-capture of South Georgia and continued to support land operations until the Argentine surrender.
148 Battery had initially been established to comprise seven teams but only five were in existence when the unit deployed to the Falklands. Major Morgan has declared: 'We ran out of NGFO parties. We did not have enough NGFO teams to meet the operational needs. We just didn't have enough people.' 86 On operations, it was sometimes necessary to split the team into two. When NGFO teams were required to separate for a particular mission, the Captain would lead one team, whilst his assistant, the bombardier, would lead the other. 87 For some operations during Operation Corporate, particularly the raids conducted by Special Forces, two or three people were often sufficient to complete the task. 88 However, whilst the separation of a team for a short period was standard practice, the shortness of manpower made it necessary to create a makeshift sixth NGFO team, led by a junior NCO, Andy Tatersall, for the initial operations.
Whilst Tatersall's performance was exemplary and beyond reproach, it was evident that five teams was not sufficient.
An essential link between the NGFO teams and the RN vessels was provided by
NGLOs on board the ships, which was derived from the experiences of the Second World
War. 89 Captain Harmes, outlined the role performed by the liaison officers:
As an NGLO I provided the ship's captain with up to date information on the land battle, the nature of the fire support his ship would be providing and what units they would be firing in support of, communicating with NGFOs and interpreting their requirements. Prior to the commencement of firing, Navy charts had to be overlaid with grid lines, a task undertaken by the Navigation Officer and the NGLO. During firing, as the NGLO, I checked for error using a check map, grid reference of target provided by the NGFO and grid position of ship given by the Navigation Officer. This allowed me to check for gross error using a range arm and protractor. 90 The NGLO's role was invaluable in compensating for the inevitable inter-service idiosyncrasies. The combination of NGFOs and NGLOs created an incredibly efficient and effective system for the control of NGS. Captain Barrow was forthright in his appraisal of the NGLOs as an 'excellent bunch'. 91 The small cadre of men from 148 Battery were equally as important as the ships themselves for the provision of NGS from the commencement to the cessation of hostilities in the South Atlantic.
148 Battery emerged from Operation Corporate with great credit, which was fortunate because their existence had been under serious threat prior to the Falklands War. Indeed, 148
Battery had even received a farewell visit from the director of the Royal Artillery. The survival of 148 Battery can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, as Major Morgan has acknowledged, the nature of the campaign necessitated the involvement of both ships armed with naval guns and NGFOs to spot for them: 'You could not have written a better operational scenario for the use of naval gunfire support. The whole operation lent itself to utilising that defence capability.' 92 Whilst an operational requirement led to the inclusion of 148 Battery, it was the exceptional performance of the unit that led to its retention. In considering the capacity to control land-based artillery, CAS, and especially NGS, Brigadier Thompson was lavish in praise for 148 Battery: 'You knew that these guys were bloody good...They were really competent guys...We had huge faith in what they could do and they did it, they produced the goods, they cut the mustard.' 93 The level of admiration was mirrored on the naval side, with Commodore Clapp adjudging 148 Battery's performance to be 'excellent', whilst also noting that it was 'vital' as the ability to control fire support effectively 'is not something that can quickly be invented'.
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The invaluable contribution made by NGS was facilitated by the role undertaken by 148 Battery as the efficiency of the gunnery could only ever be as good as the spotting. Captain Brown has remarked: 'I think the conflict saved 148. It saved naval gunfire support. It brought 148 into the spotlight in a way that it had not been in almost…living memory.' 95 It is hard to
